

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	D/SOVA		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

9 May 85

Date

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Executive Registry

85- 1868

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONPresident's  
Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board

May 8, 1985

Dear Bill:


The President has directed his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to review the support provided by the intelligence community for U.S. efforts toward arms control with the Soviet Union. (C)

As you well know, there are many elements to this matter, and we expect that our work will continue for several months. Almost immediately, however, it is apparent that many of the issues lead directly to questions about what specific forces or other military factors are important to affecting the strategic balance. Alternative positions on issues of verification, monitoring, intelligence resources and their priorities, for example, seem heavily influenced by views about which elements of the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and postures are militarily significant, and why. In addition, it appears Soviet views on this matter of strategic military significance have been different from those held by the U.S. This issue was raised, for example, in the pioneering "Joint Net Assessment" that you produced together with the Secretary of Defense. (C)

We believe that it would be very helpful to us--and, perhaps more importantly, the process underway in Geneva--to have a detailed comparison of U.S. and Soviet views concerning the elements of strategic forces and postures that are considered by each to be militarily significant, with specific application to the proposals being explored in the Geneva talks and the corresponding differences in intelligence requirements flowing from them. These comparisons could be generated by an extension of the work done for the "Joint Net Assessment." (C)

Because we believe this matter is fundamental to our work and U.S. efforts in Geneva, we hope that such an evaluation can begin promptly and be available soon. Our staff is prepared for an early meeting with your representatives to discuss these ideas in more detail. (U)

Sincerely,

Anne L. Armstrong  
ChairmanThe Honorable William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Classified by ExecDir, PFIAB  
Declassify OADRDCI  
EXEC  
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